Abstract: This paper presents a n e w w a y to assess robustness of claims from identied VAR work. All possible identications are checked for the one that is worst for the claim, subject to t he restriction that the VAR produce reasonable impulse responses to shocks. The statistic on which t he claim is based need not b e i d e ntied; thus, one can a ssess claims in large m odels using minimal restrictions. The technique reveals only weak support for the claim that monetary policy shocks contribute a small portion of t he forecast error v ariance of post-War U.S. output in standard 6-variable and 13-variable models.
In \Macroeconomics and Reality," Christopher Sims presented the rst analysis of monetary policy in vector autoregressive ( V AR) models and concluded with a warning about his six-variable, \small scale" example (1980, p.33) : \A l o ng road remains, however, between what has been displayed here and models in this style that compete seriously with existing large-scale models on their home ground| forecasting and policy projection." Sims cited the need to increase the range o f policy-relevant v ariables in the VAR and to improve m e t h ods for handling the large number of free parameters in the expanded models. After nearly 20 years on the road, the provocateur might w ell ask whether VARs can y et seriously compete with large-scale econometric models for analyzing monetary policy.
Important advances h a v e b e e n m a de. Most recently, Strongin (1995) , Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (CEE) ( 1 996) and Bernanke and Mihov ( 1995) broadened the focus from monetary aggregates to bank reserve markets. Gordon a nd Leeper (1994) and Bernanke and Mihov ( 1 995) emphasized the importance of taking account o f d i erent monetary policy regimes. Sims (1992) demonstrated the importance of including variables in the VAR such as commodity p r ices that the central bank might use in forecasting ination.
Despite t he advances, m o st published VARs are s m aller, a nd few are larger, t han Sims's originals. Sims and Zha (1996a,b) and Leeper, Sims and Zha (LSZ) (1996) recently made a major break in this respect, demonstrating how t o use Bayesian methods to study identied VAR models much larger than those previously s t u died. Further, these a uthors greatly claried the justication f or identied VAR methods.
The recent p r ogress has brought some modest claims of victory by V AR practitioners. Sims (1996) lists four conclusions: 1 M o st variation in monetary policy instruments is accounted for by responses of policy t o the state of the economy, not by random disturbances to policy behavior. 2 Responses of real variables to monetary p o licy shifts are estimated as modest or nill, d epending on the specication. 3 M o netary policy has historically increased interest rates in response to non-policy shocks that increase inationary pressure by more 1 than it would have u nder a policy of x i ng the monetary stock. 4 A r easonable picture of the eects of monetary policy shifts emerges only under identifying assumptions of delay in the reaction of certain \sluggish" private sector variables to monetary policy shifts.
Bernanke ( 1 996) and CEE (1997) give similar lists. Before these advances, there was a common view that changes in sample period, information set, and time aggregation of the data lead t o i m portant c hanges in VAR conclusions (e.g., Todd, 1991; Pagan and Robertson, 1994) . The assertions of success seem to have brought renewed vigor to the robustness discussions. Rudebusch (1997) raises several such issues, concluding that measures of m onetary policy from VARs do not m a k e sense. Bagliano and Favero (1997) nd support f o r some of Rudebusch's conclusions, especially regarding instability of estimates spanning dierent o p e r ating procedures. They conclude, however, that taking account of such issues does not substantially change certain basic conclusions from the literature. Sims ( 1996) and CEE (1997) also argue that the basic conclusions are robust. This paper analyzes a dierent dimension of robustness, focussing on the identifying assumptions. The approach is motivated by t he possibility that Sims was right about small models in \Macroeconomics and Reality." I t i s s t raightforward to show that if the world is complicated even in simple ways then small VARs cannot get the right a nswer even asymptotically|this result is little more than a statement about omitted variable bias (e.g., Faust and Leeper, 1997) . Thus, the identication of policy in small models is suspect because it rests on l a r gely unmotivated zero restrictions on omitted variables. On the other hand, large m odels require more identifying restrictions than small models, inevitably leading to t he use of less credible restrictions. Further, the very size of large models makes it dicult to implement t he sort of informal checks on the identication that are an important part of small model work. Thus, if structural conclusions from small or l a rge VAR models are to be persuasive, we need a way to assess the robustness of the results to alterations in questionable identifying restrictions.
The method in this paper takes a particular claim and checks all possible iden-tications of the VAR for the one that is worst case for the claim, subject to the restriction that t h e i m plied economic structure produce reasonable responses to policy shocks. The procedure is most easily introduced by focusing on a particular claim, and I will use Sims's second claim, which is also the subject of the empirical application. I focus on this claim since it is arguably the most important of Sims's four conclusions. The question of whether erratic monetary policy has caused recessions has been a central point o f c o n t ention in the study of business cycles for decades. It has been at the center of the VAR literature and of t he real business cycle literature, which has argued that most v ariation in output is due to non-monetary factors. In the VAR literature, as e l s ewhere, parties dier on what result is to be expected. Strongin (1995) , for example, considered the result that policy shocks have generated little output variance to be a puzzle.
This paper assesses the question from the Sims-Bernanke-CEE perspective: (*) F or every reasonable identication of the VAR, the monetary p o licy 1 shock accounts for a small share of the forecast error variance of output.
For clarity, I w ant explicitly to concede a weaker claim: Given a suciently rich information set, there exists a reasonable identication of the VAR in which the policy shock accounts for a small part of the variance of output. Of course, to r each (*) from the weaker claim, one must rule out the existence of reasonable identications in which t he policy shock a ccounts f o r a large share of output variance. The general tenor of S i m s a nd Bernanke's comments is consistent with the strong form of the claim. CEE (1997) make the strong claim explicitly and argue persuasively that supporting that claim is essential if we a r e t o c o nsider the matter decided. It is not clear how s trongly existing work supports (*). In particular, it is dicult to tell from published work how it is that reasonable identications contradicting (*) have been ruled out. B y c hecking all possible identications for the one that i s w orst from the standpoint o f the claim, the method of this paper oers a clearer means of support for such c l aims. If in the worst case the variance share is small, then the claim is supported. If the share is large, then either the identifying information|the characterization o f a r e asonable policy shock|must be sharpened or we m ust view the issue as unsettled.
The new technique reveals that (*) i s n ot strongly supported by a w ork-horse sixvariable model used in some variation by CEE (1996) , Bernanke and Mihov ( 1995) , Uhlig (1997) , and LSZ. The claim receives more, though not unequivocal, support in the 13-variable model of LSZ. In both models, there is more support for (*) in a sample spanning 1965:01{1979:09 than in a longer sample of 1960:01{1996:03.
The technique of this paper can be applied quite broadly in VAR work, and has several nice features. All identifying restrictions are s t ated explicitly, in contrast with conventional use of informal restrictions. If the claim is not supported, the approach p r o vides a counterexample and, in doing so, provides a concrete basis for further renement of the issue. Surprisingly, perhaps, the method does not r equire that the parameter on which the claim is based be identied. Thus, one can assess whether very minimal commitments regarding the economy a re sucient to support the claim. This is of particular value when using large models in which w e might not have sucient economically credible assumptions to identify the economic quantity of interest. The cost of not identifying the parameter is that the procedure only provides bounds on the parameter of interest. T h us, one must interpret the results carefully: if large variance shares seem likely under the bound, it may simply be because the bound is not very t i g h t.
This work is in the tradition of Cooley and LeRoy (1985) and Leeper and Gordon (1992) , who also assess a broad range o f identications. It is most closely related in both m o tivation and technique to Uhlig (1997) , which i s d iscussed below.
The rst section reviews why one should bother assessing the robustness of VAR identication. The following sections present a d i g ression on side-stepping identication, and give a strategy for doing so. Next come the application and the conclusions.
Identication in VARs
The identied VAR approach w as born of Sims's criticism of t he dominant approach to identication at the time. To their credit, participants in the VAR literature have remained close to these roots, paying careful attention to the dicult problem of identication in macroeconomics. In struggling for a credible identication s c heme, the VAR literature has given us informal identifying restrictions, partial identication, agnostic identication, tentative identication, and semi-structural models. All of these approaches involve identifying certain coecients i n t he conventional sense laid out by Koopmans (1953) . Thus, the labels primarily reect the self-critical stance taken to identication in this literature. As motivation f o r the robustness c heck t hat i s t he main purpose of the paper, this section reviews identication approaches in the VAR literature and some criticisms of t he approaches. The standard case
The traditional textbook case of identication begins with the model,
variables and lagged endogenous variables. The identication problem stems from t he fact that if we p remultiply the system by a full rank matrix, Q , one Q. T his requires sucient restrictions to pin down the n elements of Q; n of 5 the restrictions are normalizations that simply pick t he units for the coecients. In traditional simultaneous equations work, the model is identied exclusively using linear restrictions on the B and 0 coecients. Some important terms such a s identication, structure, a nd model have been used in many w a ys. In this paper, any set of restrictions that picks out a unique structure 2 for each reduced form identies the model. We can always write down arbitrary restrictions that achieve this end, and it is a relatively s i m ple technical matter to resolve whether a given set of restrictions identify some parameter, say, 0 . One ij can f u r ther ask whether the assumptions support a given economic interpretation of 0 as, e.g., an interest semi-elasticity of money demand. Cooley and LeRoy ij (1985) echoed the Cowles Commission in arguing the answer to this question will generally be negative if the identifying restrictions are arbitrary but may be positive if the assumptions reect beliefs about the causal mechanism operating in reality. 
A L , Lx = x , and E" " = 6 . The identication problem j t t01 t j=0 t is just as before. Those estimating identied VARs impose some linear restrictions on the As, typically in the form of zero restrictions on A . H o w ever, identied VAR work a l s o 0 always imposes the restriction that the shocks in (4) are orthogonal and imposes 0 the normalization that t he shocks have standard deviation one, E"" =I. I n s o me t t work, restrictions a r e placed on the long-run impulse response (e.g., Blanchard and Quah (1989) ), that is, on elements of C(1), where 1
The primary analytical dierence between identication in VARs and more t r aditional approaches is the use of restrictions that are not linear restrictions on the slope parameters in (4). The orthogonality restrictions and long-run restrictions are examples nonlinear restrictions.
Informal restrictions. LSZ and Sims and Zha (1996a) seem to h a v e been the rst to attempt to explain and justify the use of informal restrictions in VARs. They argue that we h a v e p rior opinions about the dynamic response of the economy t o a money supply s h o c k. For e x a mple, short-term i n terest rates rise and the money stock falls in the short-run in response to a contractionary shock. Because these impulse response restrictions are dicult to impose, one identies the model using the sort of restrictions discussed above. If the impulse responses do not look r ight, one then re-species the model in some way|either the formal identifying restrictions or the information s et might b e a ltered. Thus, the fact that s t andard VARs predicted that prices smoothly rise following a monetary contraction was declared a price puzzle, which w as solved by adding an index of commodity prices to the model.
Once the informal restrictions have been used to settle on a specication and a set of f o rmal restrictions, Bayesian coverage i n t ervals a re often computed. Generally (with the exception of Uhlig, (1997)), these intervals are computed imposing the formal restrictions and ignoring the informal ones. It is not the case that our belief in either the formal or informal restrictions is dogmatic (impervious to evidence). The ad hoc use of informal restrictions and the dogmatic application o f the formal restrictions primarily reects practical computational problems with any 3 other course. Why w e need to check the robustness of VAR identication At policy institutions and elsewhere, structural inferences must be drawn, and they are c e r tain to be drawn using approaches to identication that are fallible. Given this fact, one should at l e a st hope to know t he principle weaknesses of the approach u s ed.
Some formal restrictions are only weakly credible. To a ttain identica-tion, VAR analysts (and others) often impose restrictions that do not reect strongly held convictions. The bulk of the VAR literature has stressed restrictions on con-4 temporaneous interactions among variables. Thus, it is common to impose that output and nal goods prices do not react to money supply shocks within the smallest time period in the analysis, usually a month or quarter (CEE, 1996; Bernanke and Mihov, 1995; LSZ) . Further, LSZ assume that policy does not respond to output shocks within the period. We c a n tell plausible arguments f o r many of these restrictions, but, as LSZ and CEE ( 1997) emphasize, we c a n easily imagine these restrictions not holding. T w o b r ief examples serve to emphasize the point. On March 14 and 15, 1 9 8 0, credit controls were announced on the U.S. economy, bringing about the shortest recession in U.S. history. T he unemployment r ate, which had been unchanged for three months, jumped 0.6 percentage p o ints in April|the second largest change in the post-1950s sample. On May 2 , t he Fed responded by cutting interest rates (see, e.g., Foldessy, 1980) . Thus, over a period of 49 d a ys, a policy was adopted, the real economy r e a cted, and the policy was altered. Little other than credit controls has been put forward to account for the sharp move in the unemployment r a te, and news reports at the time make it clear that the Fed was responding to evidence about the real economy w h e n i t r esponded. Thus, it appears that the economy r e a cted to policy in less t han a month, and the Fed countered in 5 less than a month. This episode clearly involved both large a nd unique changes in policy. T he reactions to smaller policy changes are surely smaller, but are they 6 slower?
It is also common to treat federal funds rate innovations as due to policy decisions and not market forces during periods when Fed operating procedures focussed o n the funds rate (e.g., Bernanke a nd Mihov, 1995; and CEE, 1996) . This assumption generates contemporaneous restrictions on a standard V AR. Examination of the daily federal funds rate makes clear that the Fed has never attempted to control the funds rate tightly (Figure 1 ), and th a t i t h a s allowed dramatic spikes in the rate at the end of settlement periods and when end-of-year \window dressing" demands for reserves arise (see, e.g., Goodfriend, 1983) . Two s i ngle-day spikes of 200 basis points in a month c a n r a ise the monthly-average funds rate used in VARs by m o re than the standard deviation of t he unpredictable portion of t he funds rate. The year-end spike i n 1 9 86 led to a n 8 7 basis point r ise in the monthly December rate 7 that was immediately reversed (top panel). A m o re typical example came in July 1996 when the spikes at the beginning and end of the month led to a bout a 15 basis point m onthly rise and fall (bottom panel). These spike-induced changes are largely unpredictable using the standard V AR information set and, hence, will be misclassied as policy-induced shocks to supply rather than t o reserve d emand shocks under the stated identifying assumptions. These two examples are little more than anecdotes and are intended only to emphasize that when contemporaneous restrictions are put forward tentatively it is because we h a v e g ood reason to suspect them. Such suspicions naturally motivate testing the robustness of k ey conclusions to changes in less-than-fully-credible identifying restrictions.
Informal restrictions and the appearance of circularity. Uhlig (1997) has persuasively argued that the way informal restrictions are used may render the inference procedure circular. At the very least, the reader of VAR work w i l l o ften nd it dicult to t e l l i f t he procedure is circular. The problem arises because the informal restrictions are not only dicult to impose formally, t heir role is dicult to document thoroughly. T h us, when presented with results at the end of a paper, it is dicult for the reader to know which f e a tures were informally imposed as criteria for an acceptable model and which w ere freely estimated implications of the identifying restrictions.
LSZ note that t he approach might a ppear to be \data mining," and they echo the arguments o f s e l f -confessed data miners Hendry (1995) and Leamer (1978) in responding. These authors all argue that they are merely being explicit about the sort of b a c k-and-forth between data and model that is an essential part of a l l w ork 9 with non-experimental d a ta. This defense is unassailable but makes the problem no less vexing. This paper provides an additional t o o l f o r managing data mining-related problems in conducting and communicating VAR analysis. Informal restrictions and condence intervals. Neither the formal nor the informal r estrictions used in VAR work are believed dogmatically. It is probably the case, however, that the most tenable of the informal restrictions are more strongly believed than the least tenable of the formal restrictions. In calculating condence intervals, h o w ever, the formal restrictions are treated as dogmatic, while the informal ones are ignored. Thus, Bayesian c o v erage intervals for parameters are often computed by repeatedly drawing from t he posterior for the parameters implied by some reference prior, the data, and the formal restrictions.
If some aspects of t he informal prior a re strongly held, this is problematic: a n y given draw from the posterior under the formal restrictions need not s a tisfy the informal restrictions; such draws should be assigned small posterior mass. In abstract, one knows little about the relation b e t w een the intervals arising from imposing the more dogmatic among the informal restrictions and those t hat do not. T here are 8 reasons to believe that the practical importance of this problem may be small. In any case, the procedure below p r o vides an imperfect check on this point b y a llowing a g eneral loosening of restrictions and by a l l o wing imposition of both formal and informal restrictions.
The curse of dimensionality. Most, if not all, of the arguments a bove h a v e been appreciated in the literature, and they have m o tivated attempts to test the sensitivity of results t o c hanges in the identication. If one limits consideration t o fully recursive s t ructures for the economy, there are only a nite number, and one can l o o k a t a ll of them and see if answers to key questions are sensitive to which i s c hosen. Work of this t ype is common, and as Cooley and LeRoy ( 1985) argued, the results tend to v a ry across recursive s t ructures.
Moving beyond recursive systems, the set of possible identications goes from nite to uncountable. In a bi-variate VAR under the assumption of orthogonal shocks, only one further identifying restriction is required, and one can still consider all possible identications of the VAR. King and Watson (1992) show h o w t o d o this: one plots the outcome for the statistic of interest against a one-dimensional variable indexing the identication of the VAR.
As model size increases, however, the curse of dimensionality renders this process unwieldy. In a three-variable VAR, there are three free dimensions in the 9 identication, and it is already impossible to plot the parameter of interest against an index of the identication. Still, in models of three or four variables, one might be able informally to check all rotations visually by recombining the columns of a standard graph of the n 2 n impulse response function (e.g., Figure 4 ). LSZ carry out this process of robustness by ocular r o tation. For models of six variables, this is extremely dicult, and in larger models, i t m a y be impossible.
Thus, the nal diculty with the current approach to supporting claims like (*) is that in models of more than a few variables, the class of possible reasonable identications is large and is dicult to search e ectively.
A digression: side-stepping identication
We need a way t o c heck that (*) is implied by e v ery rotation of the VAR that is consistent w ith rmly held beliefs. We w ould like the method to be applicable in both s m all and large models. Our rm commitments m a y , h o w ever, be insucient to identify the variance share in (*); thus, it would be best if we could test the claim even when the statistic upon which it is based is not identied. LSZ put forward the basic idea (the notation in the quote corresponds with ( 6)):
[The assumption that the structural shocks are orthogonal] means that, in some circumstances, conclusions about model behavior are less d ependent on identifying assumptions about A than in [traditional simultaneous equations models]: : : .One might nd that the rows of C(L) that correspond to prices and interest rates (the rst and second rows, say) mostly show prices and interest rates moving in the same direction, 11 when they show a n y substantial movement.: : : One might expect that the response to a monetary policy shock should show the opposite sign pattern.: : : Then one could conclude that monetary policy disturbances cannot account f o r m uch o f the observed variation in prices and interest rates, regardless o f the specic identifying assumptions. The most concise statement of the reasoning is that when using nonlinear restrictions, data m a y be informative about a parameter that i s n ot identied. Because this notion may b e u nfamiliar, I provide a brief digression to clarify the issue. k Suppose that w e h a v e a reduced form parameterized by 2 Ra nd an associated k structural model parameterized by 2 R . E a c h structure is associated with one reduced form so that there is a function = h() giving the reduced form parameter for each structure. We wish to estimate g().
The identication problems stem from the fact that there m a y be more t han one structural parameter associated with a single . T he standard denition s t ates that the restriction 2 2 identies g() i f a nd only if ; 2 2 a nd h( ) = h ( ) = This notion m a y b e u nfamiliar|I have n ever seen it stated|because the bulk of discussion of identication treats the case of identifying slope parameters of a linear model using linear restrictions on those parameters. In this case, restrictions are informative if and only if they are identifying (see the Appendix). 12
A simple example of the distinction between informative a nd identifying restrictions is the restriction t hat structural shocks are o rthogonal. This assumption is informative about the share of the forecast error v ariance of o utput accounted for by the policy shock i n a s t andard monetary VAR. To see this, note that without any restrictions, the variance share might f a ll anywhere between zero and one. Given a VAR under the assumption of orthogonal shocks, one can compute the maximum variance share attributable to any single shock. It is well-known (and see below) that this maximum share i s g i v en by t he maximum eigen value of a matrix formed from the reduced form coecients. T h u s, the orthogonality assumption produces a bound on t he parameter of interest without identifying it.
Assessing robustness t o c hanges in identication
The goal is to see whether rmly held beliefs about the economy are suciently informative t o support c l a ims like ( * ). So long as we m a intain the orthogonality assumption, we c a n proceed using the following machinery.
The easiest form of the VAR to work with is what I will call a generic orthonormal (GO) form, which i s s i m ply a transformation of the moving-average representation in which t he variance covariance matrix is the identity m atrix:
where E"" =I. A n y r ecursive o r dering gives a GO form. Under t he assumption t t of orthogonal shocks, the impulse response of each v ariable to a n y shock i n a n y identication of t he VAR is given by the coecients o f the (n 2 1) v ector of lag polynomials:
for some satisfying = 1 .Every identication o f the full set of impulse responses to all shocks is similarly of the form: 
Given the solving the problem, the impulse response to the associated shock i s
Without the second constraint, V would be the largest eigen value of V . Withyh out the rst constraint, the problem has t he form of quadratic programming. The full problem can be solved by computing a l a r ge but nite s et of eigen value problems; thus, no general search a l g orithm is required (see the Appendix).
An algorithm for examining all relevant r otations of the VAR Suppose initially that we a re interested in point estimates only and ignore the more subtle questions raised by i n terval estimates. The following algorithm provides a w a y formally to assess claims like ( *). If it does, stop: the c l a im is contradicted. Otherwise, 5 Add a restriction ruling out whatever is unreasonable and return to 2 .
This simple algorithm has several attractive features. It provides a formal way t o c heck all possible identications of the VAR, even in relatively large systems. When the claim is falsied, it is falsied constructively: a counter-example is provided. In producing potential counter-examples, the algorithm is likely to elicit t h e p r ior from believers in the claim. The method also p r o vides a way t o d iscover which restrictions are most informative a b o ut the variance share. Imposing some restrictions may not lower the bound, while others may l o w er it sharply.
The process is no substitute for identifying a full VAR. For example, it does has no special claim to attention. Further, this discussion presumes that all the restrictions we w ould want t o impose are o f the form (13). While this need not be the case, a surprisingly large portion can be cast i n t his way. E v en so, one might exhaust all of t hese in the search.
Condence bounds
We m ight nd that there is no rotation of the point e s t imate of the reduced form that gives a large v a riance share. There still might b e r educed form parameters that are quite likely from the standpoint o f t he data and that d o admit a large variance shares under the restrictions.
Following the Bayesian approach common i n t his literature, one way to take account of uncertainty regarding the reduced form i s t o p o sit a reference prior for the parameters of the reduced form, then evaluate the posterior distribution of V yh under the chosen inequality restrictions. For reference priors such a s the standard \RATS prior" (see, e.g., Uhlig (1997) The Uhlig approach Uhlig's (1997) approach is similar in motivation and implementation to the one here. His method also i n v olves solving an optimization problem to compute an estimate of the variance share under sign restrictions on the impulse response to a policy shock. In Uhlig's c a se, the restrictions are that the response to a contractionary policy shock has the correct sign for e a c h of the rst 4 8 q u a rters on output (down), interest rates (up), money (down), a n d prices (down). These restrictions generally will not all be consistent w i t h t he reduced form, and Uhlig's method picks the shock that comes as c l o se as possible to meeting the restrictions under a loss function that penalizes bigger impulse response coecients of both signs. The penalty o n coecients of the wrong sign is 100 times larger.
While my a pproach c hooses the identication that is worst from the standpoint of (*), Uhlig's p i c ks the one that is best from the standpoint of the restrictions (under the specied loss). From the standpoint of identication, Uhlig's approach identies the response to a policy shock using dogmatic restrictions (albeit of a novel form), just as is the case with standard approaches. Uhlig's approach shares with mine the absence of i n f o rmal restrictions and will be attractive t o a n y o ne whose prior beliefs about policy are b e t ter captured by s o me loss function like U h lig's than by t raditional restrictions. Those skeptical about aspects of the loss function may s t ill want t o c h eck the robustness of the result, and my approach provides one way t o do so.
Example: a common 6-variable model
As a rst application, I consider the six-variable model of originated by C E E (1996) and Bernanke and Mihov ( 1 995) and used by both LSZ and Uhlig. The model contains output (Y ), prices (CPI), commodity prices (P C ) , nonborrowed 17 reserves (NB R), the federal funds rate (RF ), total reserves (T R ) and a constant. found with a share greater than 30 p e r cent. These shocks generally showed output moving very sharply on impact, m uch m ore sharply than t he other variables, and the interest r a te eect sometimes changed signs very quickly. T h us, I imposed that the interest rate eect was positive i n t he third month a fter the shock a nd that the contemporaneous growth rate eect on output was no more than one-quarter of the eect on the interest rate. Neither of these assumptions is uncontroversial, of course.
The bound was l o w ered to 63 percent, and the algorithm found two i d e n t ications worth discussing. I call these identications A and B; they give v ariance shares of 36 percent a nd 61 percent, respectively. The character of the response of the system to t hese shocks is very similar to that of LSZ's point e s timates (Figures 2   and 3 ). The primary dierences other than the larger output eects are that output moves a bit contemporaneously in the counter-examples, and in counter-example B, total reserves do not change contemporaneously. b) The contemporaneous Y eect in the 13-variable model is less than 1 / 2 the eect on S.
Various authors have found that the interest rate response in some models disappears in just a few months, which i s i n c onsistent w ith their views of t he persistence of the response of policy to policy shocks. Restriction 1 will help assess whether imposing this view is informative about (*). Restriction 2 rules out policy shocks in which prices smoothly rise, the classic price puzzle result. In both o f t he models, the contemporaneous restrictions alone sometimes allow shocks that appear permanently to alter the growth rate of output. While one can make a n a r gument f o r this 22 result, 3 rules out (some of) such shocks. Finally, 4 rules out shocks for w hich output moves contemporaneously more than certain nancial variables that might be thought t o be quicker moving.
23
While none of these restrictions is uncontroversial, they each seem to be the sort of thing that might h a v e been imposed informally in conventional VAR work.
24
Further, not all reasonable restrictions have been imposed. Some economists may h a v e a strong belief that policy shocks have no contemporaneous eect on prices or output. T h us, I imposed those exact restrictions and followed the standard a l g orithm until I found the policy shock i n F i g ure 6 , f or which the variance share is 24 percent. This shock looks reasonable by the standards applied throughout, and while I cannot guarantee that th i s i s t he largest variance share attributable to a reasonable shock with the two contemporaneous zero eects, it appears that imposing such zeros does lower the bound in the point estimates considerably. The search revealed another interesting feature of the data. Under the two zero restrictions, one could push th e b o u n d u p t o w ell over 30 p e r cent w i t h r esponses of essentially the same shape as those in Figure 6 . The primary dierence is that the shape of t he output eects and the commodity price eects are magnied. Indeed, for all the policy shocks displayed, if the share is higher than in the recursive model, the commodity price e ect is exaggerated. Of course, the eect in the recursive identication is already quite large, and it would be dicult to rule out a slightly larger eect a priori. Despite t his fact, further investigation o f the role of commodity prices in this model i s w arranted: the variable solves the price puzzle, but reacts far stronger and with m o re persistence than any o t her variable.
The 13-variable model
One might suppose that i f m i n i m al restrictions do not tightly bound the vari-26 ance share in a small model, then they are unlikely to do so in a large model. The intuition is that in a large model the algorithm has many m ore shocks to combine in creating a reasonable policy shock t hat has a large variance share. The alternative intuition, of course, is that with more variables controlled for, the variance share due to policy may be more sharply estimated. This later view receives some support.
Under all four optional restrictions, t he maximum variance shares at the posterior mode for the reduced form were 39, 7, a nd 21 percent f or the three versions, respectively. T h us, for the shorter sample and under the RATS p r ior for the full sample, the reduced-form point estimates are not consistent w i t h v ery large values for V .
As for the probability bounds (Table 2) For the SZ prior in the full sample, the 66 percentiles are all above 5 0 p e r cent.
It is of interest to know w h y the two priors g ive s u c h dierent answers f o r t he full sample; I currently have little to oer on this count. Those who accept the arguments of Gordon and Leeper (1994) and Bernanke a nd Mihov (1995) would tend to place less emphasis on these estimates that span clear changes in operating procedures.
While I have sympathy w i t h this view, Sims (1996) argues in f a v or of full sample estimates.
Results summary
Overall, the results regarding (*) are mixed: both the choice of reference prior and sample period seem to matter. The short sample generally provides more sup-24 restriction 50  66  50  66  50  66  1111  49  58  19  30  26  31  0111  54  63  31  44  28  33  1011  50  58  32  42  31  37  0011  55  63  43  52  34  40  1101  56  63  44  54  30  35  0101  63  69  57  66  33  37  1001  56  63  53  61  36  41  0001  63  70  62  70  39  44  1110  49  58  19  30  26  32  0110  55  63  31  44  28  33  1010  50  58  32  42  32  38  0010  55  63  43  52  34  40  1100  56  63  44  54  31  35  0100  63  70  58  67  33  38  1000  56  63  53  61  36  41  0000  63  70  63  70  39  44 Notes: See Table 1 . The simulations for the three versions each h a d 1 000 draws from the posterior. For the \1111" restrictions, 1,5, and 2 draws, respectively, w ere inconsistent w i t h the restrictions.
port for (*). The larger model also provides somewhat stronger support. Further, i m posing that the liquidity e ect on the short-term interest rate lasts at least through the ninth month after the shock o r that the contemporaneous price and output eects are exactly zero seems to lower the bound on the variance share markedly.
It is important t o r emember that what is being displayed is a posterior f or V , which bounds the variance share of interest. Thus, viewed as probability bounds on the share of interest, these numbers are conservative from the perspective o f evaluating (*). Of course, if one were interested in evaluating the smallest possible variance share of output attributable to the policy shock, one could alter the procedure to calculate a lower bound on the minimum share. Some experimentation suggests that this would likely result in a bound near zero. This would be further evidence in favor of the weak form of (*): current V AR models are consistent w i t h the variance share in output of the money shock being trivial.
It is not the case that the few restrictions considered here characterize all w e believe about policy shocks. Some nonsystematic experimentation has convinced me that imposing more restrictions would probably lower the bounds. I am currently pursuing some ideas in this regard. This paper develops and applies a scheme that can work in both large and small models. One can check the validity o f t he claim under minimal \rm" commitments about the response of the economy t o s h o c k. Further, one can determine which restrictions if any are most informative, and such restrictions can be singled out for special scrutiny. F urther, the scheme yields a constructive procedure for eliciting aspects of prior beliefs that may support claims like (*). Specically, t he algorithm generates counter-examples to the claim, and one may i n vite a b e l i ever to suggest which prior belief about policy shocks rules out such e x a mples. My l i mited experience with this algorithm suggests that it is quite useful. I v ery quickly convinced myself that the 6-variable model oered very little support for (*). Others may disagree, and the algorithm invites them to specify (and perhaps justify) restrictions that rule out the examples I nd persuasive. In the 13-variable model, the approach seems to oer somewhat more support for the claim. This support is not unequivocal and important i s s ues for further consideration include understanding d i erences in the results under the two r eference priors, and more generally, assessing what p r ior for the variance share is implied by the reference priors.
The results illustrate that certain minimal c o mmitments about the economy m a y more tightly bound structural estimates in large models than i n s mall. They call into question the view that structural inference in large models is hopeless because we s i m ply do not have e n o ugh e c o nomically meaningful identifying information to fully identify the economic structure. I hope that they bolster the impetus to study larger models of t h e s ort introduced by LSZ.
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Appendix Data
The data are from LSZ and were kindly provided by T ao Zha. All data a r e i n units o f n a tural logarithms multiplied by 1 0 0, except interest rates and unemployment rates, which a r e s t ated in percentage points. The following are the denitions of the variables as provided in LSZ.
C Personal consumption expenditures, seasonally adjusted, billions of c hain 1992 dollars.
CPIConsumer price index for a l l u r ban consumers, total, seasonally adjusted. DOL Trade-weighted value of the U.S. dollar, A tlanta Fed index, 1980=100.
INRReal private non-residential xed investment, seasonally adjusted, billions of chain 1992 dollars; monthly series interpolated using C h o w-Lin procedure with monthly data o n r eal v a lue of new construction of privately owned nonresidential industrial structures, total equipment component o f i n dustrial production, industrial m a c hinery and equipment c o mponent o f industrial p roduction, intermediate products and business supplies component of industrial production, manufacturers' shipments t o c a pital goods industries, and manufacturers' shipments of construction materials, supplies, and intermediate products.
IRReal residential xed investment, seasonally adjusted, billions of c hain 1992 dollars; interpolated using Chow-Lin procedure with monthly data on housing starts, construction supplies component of industrial production, manufacturers' shipments of construction materials, supplies, and intermediate products, a nd real v alue of n e w construction of privately owned residential b u i l dings.
M1 M1 money stock, seasonally adjusted, billions of d o llars. NBRNon-borrowed reserves plus extended credit, seasonally adjusted billions of dollars.
P CCrude materials component o f t he producers' price index, seasonally adjusted.
RF Federal funds rate, eective r a te, percent per annum. R3 3 -month Treasury bill rate, secondary market, percent per annum. R10 10-year Treasury bond yield, constant maturity, percent per annum. S Standard a nd Poor's 500 c o mposite stock price index, 1943=100. T RT otal reserves, adjusted for breaks due to changes in reserve requirements, seasonally adjusted, billions of dollars.
U Civilian unemployment rate, seasonally adjusted, percent. Y Real g ross domestic product, seasonally adjusted, billions of c hain 1992 dollars; interpolated from national income and product accounts quarterly series using Chow-Lin procedure with monthly data on total industrial production, civilian employment 1 6 y ears or older, retail sales deated by consumer prices, real personal consumption expenditures, and the National Association o f P u r c hasing Managers Composite Index. Pre-multiplying the initial rst order condition by I 0 P gives, 3 3 3
3 3 which i s s a tised by a unit-length only when is an eigen vector of (I 0 P )V .
3
What remains is to show that is the eigen vector associated with the largest eigen value.
As Rao (1964) notes, the eigen values of (I 0 P )V correspond to the eigen 
NOTES
1 Actually, w e m i g h t like t o v erify t he that (*) holds for every suciently rich information set used in the VAR. Except for an ad hoc examination of some alternative information sets, I do not take up this stronger claim in this paper.
2 I n c o n text, I treat t he following phrases as synonymous: an \identication of", a \structure consistent with" and a \model consistent w ith" a given reduced form.
3 F or example, LSZ experiment with non-dogmatic application of formal restrictions, but do not report results due to computational problems.
4 The primary alternative has been long-run restrictions. Faust and Leeper [1997] discuss the diculties with this approach.
5 F or a discussion, see the Economic Report of the President, 1 981.
6 Of course, if part of the reason for delay i s d u e t o signal extraction problems, then the reactions to large shocks (which a re easily discerned) would be faster. Under the Gaussian likelihoods used in most empirical analysis, however, large innovations are the most informative, and the identication is most suspect a t the time of large innovations.
7 I n t he 6-variable model below, this generates a 68 basis point innovation. Sims [1996] reports a funds rate regression with a standard error of about 14 basis points.
8 Chris Sims a rgued this in editorial comments on this paper.
9 Three restrictions are required after orthogonality of the errors.
10 Rothenberg [1977] gives a treatment of identication in a general setting.
11
The only restriction is that the shock h a v e v ariance one, requiring = 1 . 14 The restriction t hat the eect on output grows from period zero to one is imposed by adding a row t o C composed of 0C + C .
Rŷ1ŷ0
15 From a B a y esian perspective, we can be more explicit about the way i n w hich the statments are conservative. Specically, h a ving calculated the posterior probability, p r ( V> ) < p , one can conclude that yh pr(V > ) p
yh (given the data) under any prior that (i) shares the reference prior as the marginal prior for the reduced form parameters and that (ii) is such t hat a n y inequality restrictions imposed in calculating V hold with probability o n e .
16 If there are suciently many restrictions, then some draws f r om the posterior will be inconsistent with the restrictions. Since I am treating the restrictions as dogmatic, these draws are abandoned. Thus, the reference prior is interpreted as proportional to the prior d e nsity conditional on the reduced form and restrictions being consistent. T he ratio of the number of draws consistent with the restrictions and those inconsistent is also of i n t erest. This quantity is the posterior odds ratio in favor of the restrictions when viewing the reference prior a s a n u n c onditional prior. It may m a k e sense to c heck this value, for if the posterior odds are too low, one might w i s h t o c o n sider whether the reference prior is appropriate. Alternatively, the data may n o t be supportive of the shape restrictions.
17 For details on the data, see the Appendix. The data are from LSZ and were kindly provided by T ao Zha.
18 As in LSZ, the point estimate is the posterior m o d e u n d e r t he reference prior documented in Sims and Zha [1996b] . This prior is a modication of the \Minnesota prior" that f a v ors cointegration a nd allows imposition of identifying restrictions.
19 This is a generalization of step 4 above. It is useful to look at any e x t reme cases one comes across during the process, rather than just the worst case.
20 If businesses nd i t m o re protable to exercise xed-rate loan commitments when rates rise, then there is a short-run upward pressure on total reserves that the Fed might p a rtially accomodate.
21 There are several w a ys to do this, but a simple way comes from viewing the identied recursive f orm under the ordering given above t o b e t he GO f orm. The recursive i d e n tication c a n b e v i e w ed as being completed by c hoosing D = I in (10). The for, s a y , case A gives a fourth column for a new D. I pick the remaining columns from 1 through 6 i n t urn so that the sum of the squared o diagonal elements is as small as possible and so that the columns are mutually orthogonal. This procedure forces the earlier numbered shocks to look most like the recursive ordering, and later numbered ones have l e s s exibility t o d o s o.
22
The restriction is actually that the 108-month response minus the 60-month response is positive, which rules out shocks for which the eect is negative a t both points and larger in absolute terms at 108 months.
23 There is no reason to suppose that the price eect will be negative f o r 6 0 3 5 months unless the restrictive policy is sustained. The eect should, of course, be positive if restrictive policy shocks lead to future expansionary policy.
24 For example, the restrictions do not require that t he eect of a monetary contraction on output is negative a fter the initial month. In some V ARs, paradoxically large positive e ects a r e found. This did not seem to be the case in the work reported. 
